Disparate Impact Under the ADEA: Applicants Need not Apply by Woodward, L. Whitney
Georgia State University Law Review 
Volume 36 
Issue 2 Winter 2019-2020 Article 3 
1-1-2020 
Disparate Impact Under the ADEA: Applicants Need not Apply 
L. Whitney Woodward 
Georgia State University College of Law, lwoodward2@student.gsu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr 
 Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
L. Whitney Woodward, Disparate Impact Under the ADEA: Applicants Need not Apply, 36 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 
351 (2020). 
Available at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol36/iss2/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at Reading Room. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Georgia State University Law Review by an authorized editor of Reading Room. For more 
information, please contact mbutler@gsu.edu. 
 
 
DISPARATE IMPACT UNDER THE ADEA: 
APPLICANTS NEED NOT APPLY 
 




Generally, American employment’s default rule is employment at 
will, meaning that unless agreed upon otherwise, employers are free 
to hire and fire who they wish for any reason or no reason, so long as 
the employer’s reason is not illegal.1 Though this approach provides 
benefits to both employers and employees,2 employer practices  
before the mid-1960s often used this default position of employment 
at will to unfairly discriminate against their employees for innate 
characteristics, like race, gender, and age.3 To combat certain 
discriminatory practices, Congress, in 1964, passed Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act (Title VII), which prohibits workplace 
discrimination on the bases of race, color, sex, religion, and national 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2020, Georgia State University College of Law. Thank you to Professors Kelly 
Timmons and Megan Boyd for your guidance, encouragement, and constructive feedback during this 
Note writing process. To Joe Akers and Loren Friedman, tremendous legal minds that I am fortunate 
enough to work with each day, thank you for sharing your time and feedback with me during this 
writing expedition. Additionally, thank you to my peers from the Georgia State University Law Review 
for your time and energy in preparing this Note for publication. Finally, and most importantly, thank  
you to my family, especially my husband, son, and daughter, for your unwavering support and belief in 
me throughout this law school journey. 
1. STEVEN L. WILLBORN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 7, 395 (LexisNexis 
ed., 5th ed. 2012); see also The At-Will Presumption and Exceptions to the Rule, NAT’L ASS’N OF ST. 
LEGISLATORS, http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/at-will-employment-overview.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/HA3G-UGZE] (last visited Sept. 21, 2019) (“Thus far, Montana is the only state [in 
the United States] to have completely eliminated the at-will rule.”). 
2. Marilyn Lindblad, Advantages & Disadvantages of At-Will Employment, BIZFLUENT (Sept. 26, 
2017), https://bizfluent.com/info-8533105-advantages-disadvantages-atwill-employment.html 
[https://perma.cc/V6EJ-E5J5]; Catherine Lovering, Good Things About At-Will Employment, SMALL 
BUS.-CHRON., https://smallbusiness.chron.com/good-things-atwill-employment-34594.html 
[https://perma.cc/U4MA-UQTB] (last visited Sept. 24, 2019). Employment at will arrangements retain 
the benefit of choice for both employees and employers—the choice to walk away from the employment 
relationship if it is not working for either party. Lindblad, supra; Lovering, supra. 
3. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 90 HARV. L. REV. 380, 380–81 (1976) 
(discussing Age Discrimination in Employment Act’s creation); Tamara Lytle, Title VII Changed the 
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origin.4 Although its drafters contemplated prohibiting discrimination 
against older workers, Title VII is silent regarding age.5 This missing 
protection, however, was remedied in 1967 with the passage of the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), which stands 
outside Title VII protections and prohibits age-based employment 
discrimination.6 
Under Title VII, both non-employee applicants and employees 
alleging employment-based discrimination may bring suit under a 
disparate treatment theory, a disparate impact theory, or both.7 
Disparate treatment claims involve the employer’s intentional 
discrimination based on a prohibited factor under the law.8 In 
contrast, disparate impact claims involve employer practices that are 
facially neutral but permit an individual to prove employment 
discrimination based on the effect of an employment policy or 
practice on a protected class, rather than the employer’s intent behind 
it.9 Though many of Title VII’s interpretations were applied 
analogously to discrimination claims under the ADEA, the disparate 
impact theory was not explicitly recognized as applicable to 
employees in the ADEA context until Smith v. City of Jackson.10 
 
4. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/titlevii.cfm [https://perma.cc/4PFN-2J7H] (last visited Aug. 8, 
2019). “[A]fter the longest debate in its nearly 180-year history, the U.S. Senate passes the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964. The vote in favor of the bill is [seventy-three] to [twenty-seven]. Five hundred 
amendments were made to the bill and Congress has debated the bill for 534 hours.” 1964, U.S. EQUAL 
EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/milestones/1964.html 
[https://perma.cc/VNP8-64XE] (last visited Sept. 24, 2019). 
5. Smith v. City of Jackson, 554 U.S. 228, 232 (2005) (citing Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. 
Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 587 (2004)) (“During the deliberations that preceded the enactment of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, Congress considered and rejected proposed amendments that would have included 
older workers among the classes protected from employment discrimination.”); see Jeremy J. Glenn & 
Katelan E. Little, A Study of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 31 GPSOLO 40, 42 
(2014). 
6. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, supra note 3, at 381. 
7. WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 1, at 395. 
8. Employment Tests and Selection Procedures, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/factemployment_procedures.html [https://perma.cc/W5YM-J3D2] 
(last visited Sept. 24, 2019). 
9. Id. 
10. Smith, 554 U.S. at 233–34, 240. “[We] now hold that the ADEA does authorize recovery in 
‘disparate[]impact’ cases comparable to Griggs. Because, however, we conclude that petitioners have 
not set forth a valid disparate[]impact claim, we affirm.” Id. at 232. In Smith, although the Court agreed 
that a disparate impact right existed under the ADEA, the petitioner-employees were not successful in 
2
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However, Smith involved an employee’s ability to bring a claim of 
disparate impact age discrimination and did not address whether the 
theory of recovery was available to non-employee job applicants, 
leaving the question open as to whether applicants for employment 
have a cognizable claim under the ADEA’s disparate impact theory.11 
Part I12 of this Note addresses the current debate on this topic, 
illustrated through case law in the Eleventh Circuit,13 the Seventh 
Circuit,14 and a recent federal district court ruling in the Ninth 
Circuit.15 Part II analyzes the unambiguous, textual differences 
between the various subsections of the ADEA as well as the textual 
differences between Title VII and the ADEA.16 This Note explores 
these textual arguments through an analysis of the statutes and 
interpretative case law and concludes that, as drafted, the disparate 
impact theory of age discrimination should not be available to non- 
employee job applicants.17 Part III illustrates why utilizing a 
disparate impact theory of recovery in age discrimination cases is 
futile for non-employee job applicants, demonstrates why the current 
position held18 by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC), the administrative agency responsible for the ADEA’s 
enforcement,19 should not be determinative on this matter,20 and 
 
their claim of age-based discrimination because the employer had a “reasonable factor other than age” 
for the employment action. Id. at 244. 
11. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 806 F.3d 1288, 1292 (11th Cir. 2015), rev’d en banc, 
839 F.3d 958 (11th Cir. 2016). 
12. See infra Part I. 
13.   See, e.g., Villarreal, 806 F.3d at 1288 (2015). 
14. See, e.g., Kleber v. CareFusion Corp., 888 F.3d 868 (7th Cir. 2018), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 914 
F.3d 480 (7th Cir. 2019). 
15. See, e.g., Rabin v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 236 F. Supp. 3d 1126 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
16. See infra Part II. 
17. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958, 969 (11th Cir. 2016). 
18.    29 C.F.R. § 1625.2 (2007); 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(c) (2012). 
It is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an individual in any aspect of 
employment because that individual is [forty] years old or older, unless one of the 
statutory exceptions applies. Favoring an older individual over a younger individual 
because of age is not unlawful discrimination under the ADEA, even if the younger 
individual is at least [forty] years old. However, the ADEA does not require 
employers to prefer older individuals and does not affect applicable state, municipal, 
or local laws that prohibit such preferences. 
29 C.F.R. § 1625.2 (2007) (emphasis added). 
19. About EEOC, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/index.cfm [https://perma.cc/CD84-GNZF] (last visited Sept. 24, 2019). The 
3
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proposes a new pathway to support older job applicants in their 
quests for employment.21 This Note advocates for Congress, through 
legislative action, and the EEOC, through its rulemaking 
responsibilities, to develop incentives and education initiatives for 
employers to eliminate the unconscious biases and stereotypes often 
encumbering older workers.22 
 
I. Background 
Although the ADEA recognizes disparate treatment claims  for 
both employees and applicants,23 the ADEA’s recently recognized 
disparate impact language, appearing in Title 29, § 623(a)(2) of the 
United States Code, contains slightly different language.24 In Smith, 
the Court first recognized the disparate impact theory for employees 
under the ADEA but also noted that this theory is narrower under the 
ADEA than it is under Title VII.25 Although Title VII explicitly 
 
EEOC enforces employment discrimination laws provided under various federal laws like Title VII and 
the ADEA. Id. One of the agency’s primary responsibilities is to investigate discrimination charges 
raised by workers, make a finding, and either settle with or sue the employer in response to 
discriminatory behavior. Id. 
20. Villarreal, 839 F.3d at 970. 
Because “[t]he judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction,” we 
must first “employ[] [the] traditional tools of statutory construction” to determine 
whether the meaning of the statute is clear. Although employing the traditional tools 
of statutory construction may require some effort, that effort does not make a text 
ambiguous. We have employed the traditional tools of statutory interpretation here, 
and we conclude that the only reasonable meaning of the statute is that a job applicant 
cannot sue under [§] 4(a)(2). 
Id. (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)) (citing 
Wagner Seed Co. v. Bush, 946 F.2d 918, 924 (D.C. Cir. 1991)) (citations omitted). 
21. See infra Part III. 
22. See infra Part III. 
23. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for an employer . . . to fail or refuse 
to hire or discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age ”). 
24. Id. § 623(a)(2) (“It shall be unlawful for an employer to limit, segregate, or classify his 
employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment 
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as  an  employee, because  of  such  individual’s 
age ”). 
25. Smith v. City of Jackson, 554 U.S. 228, 240 (2005). Smith involved claims by age forty and 
older employees, arguing that the city’s adopted pay plan, granting raises to all city employees, provided 
a greater percentage of income raises to younger employees than older employees. Id. at 230. The pay 
plan’s purpose was to “attract and retain qualified people, provide incentive for performance, maintain 
competitiveness with other public sector agencies and ensure equitable compensation to all employees 
regardless of age, sex, race and/or disability” and accomplished this purpose partly through bringing all 
4
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 3
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol36/iss2/3
2020] DISPARATE IMPACT 355 
 
 
recognizes that both employees and job applicants may raise 
disparate impact claims,26 the question of whether non-employee job 
applicants may raise disparate impact claims under the ADEA 
remains unsettled.27 The following cases illustrate this timely 
debate.28 
 
A. The Eleventh Circuit: Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. 
In Villarreal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals considered 
whether a non-employee job applicant could sue a potential employer 
for age discrimination under the ADEA pursuant to a disparate 
impact theory.29 In 2007, forty-nine-year-old Richard Villarreal 
applied for a territory manager position with R.J. Reynolds Tobacco 
Company (R.J. Reynolds).30 The position guidelines targeted 
candidates “[two to three] years out of college,” and more 
specifically, sought applicants who “adjust[] easily to changes.”31  
The job position’s recruiter was also advised to “‘stay away from’ 
applicants ‘in sales for [eight to ten] years.’”32 Villarreal applied to 
work at R.J. Reynolds six times but was screened out based on the 
aforementioned guidelines or rejected each time.33 
In May 2010, Villarreal filed a charge of discrimination with the 
EEOC, alleging that R.J. Reynolds discriminated against him because 
 
starting salaries of police officers up to the regional average. Id. at 231. Those with less tenure benefited 
from the pay adjustments with higher percentage of pay adjustments than the percentage of pay 
adjustments for higher tenured police officers. Id. The claimants in the case consisted of officers with 
more seniority (i.e., more than five years of service) who also happened to be age forty and over. Id. 
26. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2012). 
27. See Kleber v. CareFusion Corp., 888 F.3d 868, 870 (7th Cir. 2018), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 914 
F.3d 480 (7th Cir. 2019) (holding, before vacated en banc, that both employees and applicants may sue 
employer or potential employer, respectively, for age discrimination under disparate impact theory); 
Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958, 961 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that applicant 
cannot sue potential employer for age discrimination under disparate impact theory); Rabin v. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 236 F. Supp. 3d 1126, 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (holding that both 
employees and applicants may sue an employer or potential employer, respectively, for age 
discrimination under disparate impact theory). 
28. See Kleber, 888 F.3d at 871; Villarreal, 839 F.3d at 961; Rabin, 236 F. Supp. 3d at1127. 
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of his age.34 After receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter35 in April 
2012, Villarreal filed an age discrimination suit against R.J. 
Reynolds.36 One count37 of the plaintiff’s complaint alleged disparate 
impact under ADEA § 4(a)(2).38 
The district court dismissed the plaintiff’s disparate impact claim, 
holding that only employees, not job applicants, could pursue a 
disparate impact theory of recovery under the ADEA.39 In 2015, a 
divided panel of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the 
lower  court’s  decision,  ruling  as  a  matter  of  first  impression that 
§ 4(a)(2) of the ADEA authorized applicants for employment—not 
just employees—to bring disparate impact claims.40 The court’s 
decision hinged not on the plain language of the statute, but instead 
stemmed from the court’s view that the statute was unclear, and thus 
the EEOC’s interpretation was entitled to  deference.41  This decision, 
 
34. Id. 
35. What You Can Expect After You File a Charge, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/process.cfm [https://perma.cc/6Q6M-PLSB] (last visited Sept. 24, 
2019). Generally, before a claimant alleging employment discrimination may sue, the claimant must 
first file a charge with the EEOC, allowing the EEOC 180 days to investigate the matter. Id. If the 
EEOC is unable to determine that discrimination happened, the agency issues a right-to-sue letter to the 
claimant so that a lawsuit may be filed. Id. For violations of the ADEA, a claimant may file suit after the 
passage of sixty days from filing the charge with the EEOC, and no right-to-sue letter is required. Id. 
36. Villarreal, 839 F.3d at 961–62. 
37. Id. Although the plaintiff alleged two counts of age discrimination against defendant employer, 
disparate treatment and disparate impact, he voluntarily dismissed the disparate treatment claim, only 
moving forward on the ADEA disparate impact theory. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 806 
F.3d 1288, 1292 (11th Cir. 2015), rev’d en banc, 839 F.3d 958 (11th Cir. 2016). 
38. Villarreal, 839 F.3d at 961–62. 
Villarreal brought a collective action against R.J. Reynolds . . . under the Act on 
behalf of “all applicants for the Territory Manager position who applied for the 
position since the date R[.]J[.] Reynolds began its pattern or practice of 
discriminating against applicants over the age of [forty] . . . ; who were [forty] years 
of age or older at the time of their application; and who were rejected for the 
position.” The complaint alleged two counts: disparate treatment under [§] 4(a)(1) of 
the Act and disparate impact under [§] 4(a)(2) of the Act. 
Id. 
39. Villarreal, 806 F.3d at 1291. 
40. Id. at 1290. 
41. Id. 
The EEOC’s current ADEA disparate impact regulation, issued under its statutory 
rulemaking authority . . . does not distinguish between prospective and existing 
employees. Instead, it states that, “[a]ny employment practice that adversely affects 
individuals within the protected age group on the basis of older age is discriminatory 
unless the practice is justified by a ‘reasonable factor other than age.’”. . The 
regulation extends disparate impact liability to all “individuals within the protected 
age group.” The EEOC argues that the regulation therefore established the agency’s 
6
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however, was vacated pending a rehearing en banc in early 2016.42 
On October 5, 2016, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en 
banc, held that job applicants are not entitled to bring disparate 
impact claims under § 4(a)(2) of the ADEA because the applicant has 
no “status as an employee.”43 Thus, although the Eleventh Circuit 
permits job applicants to bring ADEA disparate treatment claims 
(i.e., claims of intentional age discrimination),44 those same non- 
employee job applicants may not bring ADEA disparate impact 
claims.45 
 
B. The Seventh Circuit: Kleber v. CareFusion Corporation 
In 2018, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Kleber also heard 
a case on this issue: whether the ADEA’s disparate impact provision 
protects job applicants in addition to current employees.46 Here, Dale 
Kleber, a fifty-eight-year-old attorney with extensive experience 
across multiple industries, applied for a senior counsel position with 
CareFusion Corporation (CareFusion), a healthcare products 
employer.47 Although the employer’s job posting noted a desire for  
“a business person’s lawyer” with experience handling “complex 
projects,” the employer also included a provision stating that 
applicants “must have ‘[three] to [seven] years (no more than [seven] 
years) of relevant legal experience.’”48 The fifty-eight-year-old 
 
view that § 4(a)(2) protects any individual an employer discriminates against, 
regardless of whether that individual is an employee or job applicant. 
Id. at 1299 (citations omitted). 
42. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958, 962 (11th Cir. 2016). 
43. Id. at 961. 
[Section 4(a)(2) of the Act] makes it “unlawful for an employer . . . to limit, 
segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to 
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his 
status as an employee, because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2). . . . 
If the text of the statute is clear, “that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as 
the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” 
Id. at 963 (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)). 
44. Id. at 970. “Congress did not leave applicants without recourse. Section 4(a)(1) provides them 
with a cause of action for disparate treatment.” Id. (citing ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2012)). 
45. Id. at 963. 
46. Kleber v. CareFusion Corp., 888 F.3d 868, 870 (7th Cir. 2018), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 914 F.3d 
480 (7th Cir. 2019). 
47. Id. at 871. 
48. Id. 
7
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attorney submitted his application but was not selected to interview 
because, according to the employer, the role’s years of experience 
maximum precluded this applicant’s consideration.49 
Kleber filed an age discrimination charge with the EEOC alleging 
age discrimination stemming from CareFusion’s decision to exclude 
him from consideration because of his years of experience.50 After 
CareFusion provided its business rationale for the years of experience 
maximum, the EEOC issued Kleber a right-to-sue letter. 51 Kleber 
then filed a lawsuit against CareFusion which included a claim of 
disparate impact age discrimination under § 4(a)(2) of the ADEA.52 
Therein, Kleber specifically alleged that “the maximum experience 
cap was ‘based on unfounded stereotypes and assumptions about 
older  workers,  deters  older   workers   from   applying   for 
positions . . . and has a disparate impact on qualified applicants over 
the age of [forty].’”53 Relying on precedent, the district court 
dismissed the plaintiff’s claim, professing that the ADEA’s disparate 
impact provision applies only to employees, not non-employee job 
applicants;54 however, on appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed, 
holding, unlike the Eleventh Circuit,55 that non-employee job 
applicants are protected under the ADEA’s disparate impact 





Because of the experience cap, Kleber filed a charge of age discrimination with the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. CareFusion responded in a letter to the 
EEOC saying its maximum experience cap in the job posting was an “objective 
criterion based on the reasonable concern that an individual with many more years of 
experience would not be satisfied with less complex duties . . . which could lead to 
issues with retention.” 
Kleber, 888 F.3d at 871. 
52. Id. Plaintiff applicant initially filed an age discrimination suit under both disparate treatment and 
disparate impact theories; however, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the disparate treatment claim, 
proceeding only with the disparate impact theory. Id. at 871–72. 
53. Id. at 871. 
54. Id. at 872 (citing Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073 
(7th Cir. 1994)). 
55. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958, 961 (11th Cir. 2016). 
56. Kleber, 888 F.3d at 888. 
Given the statutory language in § 623(a)(2), the interpretation of that language in 
Smith and virtually identical language in Griggs, and the absence of any apparent 
policy rationale for barring outside job applicants from raising disparate impact 
8
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Circuit vacated the decision, required a rehearing en banc, and 
subsequently affirmed the district court’s holding that pursuant to the 
plain language of § 4(a)(2), job applicants are not entitled to bring 
disparate claims under the ADEA.57 
 
C. A Ninth Circuit District Court: Rabin v. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP 
In Rabin, the Northern District of California recently broached the 
topic of whether, in addition to employees, job applicants also had 
the right to raise disparate impact claims under the ADEA.58 Rabin 
filed suit against PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), “alleging that PwC 
‘engages in systemic and pervasive discrimination against older job 
applicants . . . maintain[ing] hiring policies and practices for giving 
preference to younger employees that result in the disproportionate 
employment of younger applicants.’”59 Recognizing that neither the 
Ninth Circuit nor the Supreme Court had ruled specifically on this 
applicant issue, the court held that the right to file ADEA-related 
disparate impact claims attaches to employees and applicants.60 
 
II. Analysis 
Although current case law highlights debate as to whether the 
ADEA § 4(a)(2) covers non-employee job applicants,61 a literal 




claims, we are not persuaded by the defendant’s more subtle comparative arguments 
using various other statutory provisions. 
Id. 
57. Kleber v. CareFusion Corp., 914 F.3d 480, 481 (7th Cir. 2019). “In the end, the plain languageof 
§ 4(a)(2) leaves room for only one interpretation: Congress authorized only employees to bring disparate 
impact claims.” Id. at 485. 
58. Rabin v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 236 F. Supp. 3d 1126, 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
59. Id. at 1127. 
60. Id. at 1128. “Based on the language of the ADEA, existing precedent, agency interpretations of 
the ADEA, and the Act’s legislative history, the Court today concludes that job applicants like 
[p]laintiffs may bring disparate impact claims.” Id. 
61. See Kleber, 888 F.3d at 871; Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958, 961 (11th 
Cir. 2016); Rabin, 236 F. Supp. 3d at 1127. 
62. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)–(d) (2012). 
9
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comparison of the ADEA to close companion legislation, Title VII,63 
settles this debate. First, the section of the ADEA giving rise to 
disparate impact claims omits the needed reference for non-employee 
job applicant protection from employer related actions.64 Next, 
language used in other portions of the ADEA expressly includes 
applicant language or references to hiring activities.65 This distinction 
illustrates that Congress made explicit language choices when 
drafting the comprehensive statute. Additionally, when comparing 
the ADEA to Title VII, legislation passed five years before the 
ADEA and protecting certain innate characteristics other than age,66 
the statutes’ different language again demonstrates that Congress 
knew the specific words to include when the intent was to reach non- 
employee applicants and chose not to include those words in ADEA 
§ 4(a)(2). Without congressional action amending ADEA 
§ 4(a)(2) to expressly include a group of individuals so clearly 
omitted from the current language, judicial inquiry is complete.67 
 
A. Congress Means What It Says and Says What It Means 
As noted in Smith, the United States Supreme Court recognizes 
disparate    impact    claims    under    the    ADEA68     through ADEA 
§ 4(a)(2).69 That particular section’s ADEA language “focuses on the 
effects of the action on the employee rather than the motivation for 
the action of the employer,” meaning that the claim analysis is only 
one of disparate impact, rather than disparate treatment, where the 
 
63. Glenn & Little, supra note 5. 
64. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 554 U.S. 228, 232–33 (2005). 
65. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), (b), (c)(1)–(2), (d)(2012). 
66. Glenn & Little, supra note 5. 
67. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958, 963 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)). 
68. Smith, 554 U.S. at 232. 
69. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2012). 
[N]or the comparable language in the ADEA simply prohibits actions that “limit, 
segregate, or classify” persons; rather the language prohibits such actions that 
“deprive . . . or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such 
individual’s” . . . age[] (explaining that in disparate[]impact cases, “the employer’s 
practices may be said to ‘adversely affect [an individual’s status] as an employee’”). 
Thus the text focuses on the effects of the action on the employee rather than the 
motivation for the action of the employer. 
Smith, 554 U.S. at 235–36 (citations omitted). 
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result turns on an employer’s intentional discriminatory 
motivations.70 So, although Smith affirmatively recognizes the 
ADEA’s disparate impact right, the case squarely focuses on 
employees, not non-employee job applicants.71 Moreover, ADEA 
§ 4(a)(2) does not, specifically or generally, reference applicants or 
individuals contemplated for hire.72 Lastly, when comparing the 
ADEA’s language in § 4(a)(2) to other portions of the ADEA, it is 
clear that when Congress desires the inclusion of applicants or 
individuals contemplated for hire, the legislature knows the particular 
words to include.73 As it relates to judicial interpretation of statutes, 
courts leverage the canons of construction to guide their statutory 
interpretation journey.74 However, when a court “find[s] the terms of 
a statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete . . . .”75 The 
ADEA’s applicant language, or lack thereof, tells the judiciary all 
that is needed without jumping through secondary or tertiary  
statutory interpretation hoops beyond the written words.76 
 
1. The ADEA Text for Applicants to Raise Disparate Impact 
Claims Is Missing 
The ADEA’s development in 1967 came on the heels of a 
Congress-commissioned Secretary of Labor report on age 
discrimination.77 This report, the Wirtz Report, involved extensive 
 
 
70. Smith, 554 U.S. at 236. 
71. Id. at 232. 
72. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2012). 
73. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958, 967 (11th Cir. 2016). 
74. Canon of Construction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“A rule used in construing 
legal instruments, esp[ecially] contracts and statutes; a principle that guides the interpreter of a text.”). 
[C]anons of construction are . . . rules of thumb that help courts determine the 
meaning of legislation, and in interpreting a statute[,] a court should always turn first 
to one, cardinal canon before all others. We have stated time and again that courts 
must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute 
what it says there When the words of a  statute  are unambiguous, then, this first 
canon is also the last: “judicial inquiry is complete.” 
Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992) (quoting Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 
424, 430 (1981)). 
75. Rubin, 449 U.S. at 430. 
76. Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2118 (2016). 
77. Glenn & Little, supra note 5. 
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study regarding the plight of “older workers”78 in America— 
specifically, employers’ tendencies to terminate older workers’ 
employment and employers’ failure to hire workers age forty and 
over.79 Given the proximity of the Wirtz Report to the ADEA’s 
inception, it would be untenable to argue that applicants were not 
considered in the ADEA’s development. The statute’s development 
contemplated older applicants in the case of employer practices;80 
however, only in ADEA § 4(a)(1), not § 4(a)(2)81—the section that 
Smith recognized as providing ADEA’s disparate impact right82— 
 
 
78. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER AGE 
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR TO THE CONGRESS UNDER 
SECTION 715 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (June 30, 1965) 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/adea50th/wirtz_report.cfm [https://perma.cc/X3KY-EYCW] 
[hereinafter WIRTZ REPORT]. “Older workers” is a term of art used throughout writings about the 
ADEA. Glenn & Little, supra note 5, at 41. When the ADEA was originally passed, it provided 
protection for older workers, meaning those workers age forty to seventy. Id. Although the lower age 
threshold of forty currently remains the starting point of the ADEA’s protection, any reference to an age 
cap was removed from the ADEA during its 1986 amendment. Id. Therefore, the ADEA today provides 
protection for workers age forty and older. Id. 
79. WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 78, at 2–3. One of the WIRTZ REPORT’s findings illustrated the 
negative effect that arbitrary job age limits had on older workers. Id. at 6. According to a 1965 U.S. 
Department of Labor Bureau of Employment Security survey of hiring practices in five cities, “older 
workers represent less than [five] percent of new hires in most establishments.” Id. at 7. 
80. Glenn & Little, supra note 5. 
Testimony before the Senate General Subcommittee on Labor and Public Welfare in 
1967 revealed a number of troubling statistics that helped motivate Congress to take 
action. For example, in 1964, applicants over [fifty-five] years of age were barred 
from half of all job openings in the private sector. Workers over [forty-five] were 
barred from a quarter of these jobs, and workers over [sixty-five] were barred from 
almost all of them. 
The data presented to Congress also indicated that the problem was worsening 
over time—jobs were disappearing, and older workers were bearing the brunt of the 
layoffs. Between 1965 and 1966 alone, the share of workers unemployed for [twenty- 
seven] weeks or more that were over age [forty-five] increased from 30.2 percent to 
34.3 percent. Older men, it was reported, had been leaving the workforce in droves 
since 1951. 
Id. 
81. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)–(2) (2012). The ADEA’s distinctly different employer practice 
sections are as follows: 
(a) Employer practices[:] It shall be unlawful for an employer— 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age; 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive 
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise 
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s age . . . . 
Id. (emphasis added). 
82. Smith v. City of Jackson, 554 U.S. 228, 235–36 (2005). 
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does the ADEA reference unlawfulness when employers “fail or 
refuse to hire . . . because of such individual’s age.”83 
The text of the statute is clear: an employer’s failure-to-hire or 
refusal-to-hire actions of non-employee job applicants are only 
included in ADEA § 4(a)(1), providing a claim for disparate 
treatment.84 ADEA § 4(a)(2), alternatively, provides protection to “an 
individual only if he has a ‘status as an employee.’”85 To read non- 
employee applicants into § 4(a)(2) requires textual gymnastics that 
run counter to the rules of statutory interpretation.86 Courts agree: “If 
the text of the statute is clear, ‘that is the end of the matter; for the 
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously 
expressed intent of Congress.’”87 Here, Congress provided clarity in 
the statute by adding words to include coverage for non-employee job 
applicants in ADEA § 4(a)(1) but declining to use the same non- 
employee applicant inclusive language in 
§ 4(a)(2)88—the only subpart giving rise to disparate impact claims 
under the ADEA.89 Thus, if the statute’s language or lack thereof is 








83. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2012). 
84. Id. 
85. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958, 963 (11th Cir. 2016). 
86. See id. at 963–66; see also Kavanaugh, supra note 76, at 2121. 
87. Villarreal, 839 F.3d at 963 (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. 467 
U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)). 
88. Id. at 967. 
89. Smith v. City of Jackson, 554 U.S. 228, 232 (2005). 
90. Villarreal, 839 F.3d at 963 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43). “Although employing the 
traditional tools of statutory construction may require some effort, that effort does not make a text 
ambiguous.” Id. at 970 (citing Wagner Seed Co. v. Bush, 946 F.2d 918, 924 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). 
The American rule of law . . . depends on neutral, impartial judges who say what the 
law is, not what the law should be [T]his goal is not merely personal preference 
but a constitutional mandate in a separation of powers system. Article I assigns 
Congress, along with the President, the power to make laws. Article III grants the 
courts the “judicial Power” to interpret those laws in individual “Cases” and 
“Controversies.” When courts apply doctrines that allow them to rewrite the laws (in 
effect), they are encroaching on the legislature’s Article I power. 
Kavanaugh, supra note 76, at 2120 (citations omitted). 
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2. Section 4(a)(2)’s Text Differs from Other Parts of the ADEA 
In addition to the clear omission of words in ADEA § 4(a)(2)91  
that would give disparate impact claim rights to non-employee 
applicants, the employment status language giving rise to ADEA 
disparate impact claims differs not only from § 4(a)(1) but also from 
ADEA subsections 4(b),92 4(c)(2),93 and 4(d).94 In each of these 
subsections, the statute provides overt recognition of applicants as 
protected from the unlawful practices listed.95 Clearly, Congress 
knows how to phrase legislation to include non-employee job 
applicants within the statute’s purview.96 
ADEA § 4(b) explicitly provides that an employment agency’s97 
“fail[ure] or refus[al] to refer for employment . . . any individual 
because of . . . age” is unlawful.98 Like § 4(a)(1), this portion of the 
 
 
91. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2012). 
92. Id. § 623(b) (“Employment agency practices[:] It shall be unlawful for an employment agency to 
fail or refuse to refer for employment, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of 
such individual’s age, or to classify or refer for employment any individual on the basis of such 
individual’s age.”). 
93. Id. § 623(c)(2). 
(c) It shall be unlawful for a labor organization— 
(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate against, 
any individual because of his age; 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership, or to classify or fail or refuse to 
refer for employment any individual, in any way which would deprive or tend to 
deprive any individual of employment opportunities, or would limit such employment 
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee or as an 
applicant for employment, because of such individual’s age . . . . 
Id. § 623(c)(1)–(2) (emphasis added). 
94. Id. § 29 U.S.C. § 623(d). 
It shall be unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or 
applicants for employment, for an employment agency to discriminate against any 
individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against any member thereof or 
applicant for membership, because of such individual, member or applicant for 
membership has opposed any practice made unlawful by this section, or because such 
individual, member or applicant for membership has made a charge, testified, 
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or litigation 
under this chapter. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
95. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(b), (c)(1)–(2), (d). 
96. Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992); Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco 
Co., 839 F.3d 958, 966–68 (11th Cir. 2016). 
97. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(b). “A business that procures, for a fee, employment for people and 
employees for employers. Whether the employer or the employee pays the fee depends on the terms of 
the agreement.” Employment Agency, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
98. ADEA, § 29 U.S.C. § 623(b). 
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ADEA erases any question about whether non-employee applicants 
qualify by specifically outlining age discrimination protection for 
workers before employment.99 Additionally, ADEA § 4(d) prohibits 
age discrimination by an employer when “any of his employees or 
applicants for employment . . . opposed any practice made unlawful 
by [the ADEA] . . . or made a charge, testified, assisted, or 
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or 
litigation under this chapter.”100 Here, again, a subsection of the same 
comprehensive statute overtly includes applicants versus § 4(a)(2)’s 
clear omission of applicants and the hiring process.101 
Finally, ADEA § 4(c), governing labor organization practices,102 is 
crafted to mirror § 4(a), applicable to employers,103 including distinct 
subsections giving rise to disparate treatment and disparate impact 
claims, respectively.104 However, the two subsections expressly differ 
in that § 4(c) references “any individual because of his age” and 
actions that “limit such employment opportunities or . . . adversely 
affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for employment, 
because of . . . age[,]”105 whereas § 4(a)(2) entirely omits any 
reference to applicants for employment.106 Here, again, Congress 
chose to include applicant language within another subsection of the 
ADEA,  § 4(c),  without  doing  the  same  in  a  preceding provision, 
§ 4(a)(2).107 In citing to Reading Law by Antonin Scalia and Bryan 
Garner, Villarreal quotes: “The  text  must  be  construed  as  a 
whole.        A word or phrase is presumed to bear the same meaning 
throughout a text; a material variation in terms suggests a variation in 
 
99. Id. 
100. Id. § 623(d) (emphasis added). 
101. Id. § 623(a)(2), (d). 
102. Id. § 623(c). “A labor organization is an association of workers who have combined to protect or 
promote their interests by bargaining collectively with their employers to secure better working 
conditions, wages, and similar benefits.” Labor Organizations, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/other-non-profits/labor-organizations [https://perma.cc/E4TH- 
T6A8] (last visited Sept. 25, 2019). 
103.   ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a). 
104. Smith v. City of Jackson, 554 U.S. 228, 232 (2005); Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 
609 (1993). 
105. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(c) (emphasis added). 
106. Id. § 623(a). 
107. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958, 963 (11th Cir. 2016). 
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the meaning.”108 As illustrated by ADEA subsections 4(a)(1), 4(b), 
4(c), and 4(d), Congress knew how to grant non-employee applicants 
ADEA protection; hence, the stark omission of applicant language in 
§ 4(a)(2) requires a reading to include only those individuals with 
“status as an employee.”109 
The 1967 Wirtz Report, noted previously as the impetus for the 
ADEA’s creation, studied the plight of older workers, both actively 
working and those seeking employment,110 and served as the research 
driven legislative foundation for this statutory protection of workers 
age forty and older. Leaning on that report, Congress expressly 
included the coverage of non-employee job applicants in ADEA 
subsections 4(a)(1), 4(b), 4(c)(2), and 4(d).111 However, Congress’s 
overt omission of any non-employee job applicant language in 
ADEA § 4(a)(2), in contrast to the language choices in those other 
subparts of the ADEA112 and the research embedded in the legislative 
foundation’s Wirtz Report,113 further solidifies the position that, as 
drafted today, § 4(a)(2) of the ADEA does not, nor did Congress 
intend for it to, provide a non-employee job applicant disparate 
impact right under the ADEA. Yet again, if the statute’s language or 
lack thereof is clear, the interpretive role of the judiciary ends.114 
 
B. The ADEA Differs from Title VII 
The ADEA is often described as a Title VII offshoot because it 
passed just three years after Title VII.115 Although legislative records 
indicate that age was debated as a potential protected class when  
Title VII was drafted, age did not make the cut in Title VII’s 
protections of race, color, sex, religion, and national origin.116  
Instead, age received its own unique protections under the ADEA in 
 
108. Id. 
109. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2). 
110. WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 78, at 7. 
111. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), (b), (c)(1)–(2), (d). 
112. See id. § 623(a)(1), (b), (c)(1)–(2), (d); Villarreal, 839 F.3d at 963. 
113. WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 78, at 7. 
114. Villarreal, 839 F.3d at 963; Kavanaugh, supra note 76, at 2120. 
115. Glenn & Little, supra note 5. 
116. Id. 
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1967 after completion of the Wirtz Report.117 Although separate 
statutes, the courts through the years often interpreted Title VII and 
the ADEA similarly.118 For example, the Court in Smith held that  
“the ADEA does authorize recovery in ‘disparate[]impact’ cases 
comparable to Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,”119 a purely Title VII 
challenge. Title VII does recognize disparate impact claims for both 
applicants and employees;120 however, the disparate impact right in 
Griggs specifically applied to employees, not non-employee 
applicants.121 
Griggs, a 1971 seminal case, established the disparate impact 
theory as cognizable under Title VII.122 This case involved thirteen 
African-American employees of a power generation facility claiming 
that the requirement of obtaining a high school education or passing 
an intelligence test to transfer out of the lowest paying department in 
the company had a disparate impact on African-American versus 
Caucasian employees.123 Before Title VII’s passage, this defendant- 
employer had an overt policy of discrimination, precluding African- 
American employees from working in any department except for the 
lowest paying labor department.124 To comply with Title VII, the 
company introduced a facially neutral policy125 to 
 
117. Smith v. City of Jackson, 554 U.S. 228, 232–33 (2005); WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 78, at 2–3; 
Glenn & Little, supra note 5, at 43. 
118. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 183 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
119. Smith, 554 U.S. at 232. 
120. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2012). Though, today, Title VII 
covers both applicants and employees, the Griggs case only contemplated a disparate impact right for 
employees, not non-employee applicants, and the case did so before the amendment of Title VII’s 
additional coverage for applicants for employment. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 
958, 968 (11th Cir. 2016). 
[The] [d]issent contend[s] that the Supreme Court has since described Griggs as a 
case about applicants, but they are incorrect. Villarreal quotes language about 
applicants and Griggs from Dothard v. Rawlinson, but because the Supreme Court 
decided Dothard after Congress added language about applicants to Title VII 
(“employees or applicants for employment”), we do not consider this dicta 
significant. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
121. Villarreal, 839 F.3d at 968 (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426 (1971)). 
122. Smith, 554 U.S. at 234–35. 
123. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 425–26. 
124. Id. at 426–27. 
125. Id. at 427–28. A facially neutral policy or factor means that the charging party must “identify the 
‘particular employment practice’ causing” a disproportionate impact on a protected class of people. 
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replace its previously overt and intentionally discriminatory race- 
based policy.126 The Court, however, deemed the new facially neutral 
policy to have the effect of “‘freez[ing]’ the status quo of prior 
discriminatory employment practices,” an unlawful disparate impact 
on African-Americans under Title VII.127 Although Griggs involved 
job qualifications to enter certain employer defined roles, the 
plaintiffs there were employees, not non-employee applicants.128 
Thus, the connection of the ADEA disparate impact theory 
determined in Smith to the comparable Title VII disparate impact 
theory found in Griggs only supports the disparate impact theory 
recognition for employees.129 This position harmonizes with the prior 
statutory language arguments; without express inclusion of non- 
employee job applicant language at the time of a court’s statutory 
review, the interpretive role of the judiciary ends when it encounters 
unambiguous statutory language.130 
Although it is true today that either employees or non-employee 
applicants may raise Title VII disparate impact claims,131 the rights  
of applicants under Title VII developed only after Title VII’s 
amendment132 and a subsequent Griggs case, Dothard v. Rawlinson, 
leveraging the amended language. 133 The 1977 Dothard case 
 
WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 1, at 457. The employer need not have any discriminatory intent and may 
actually have good intentions when designing the policy that is later deemed to have a disproportionate 
impact on a legally protected group of individuals. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432. “Congress directed the 
thrust of the Act [Title VII] to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation.” 
Id. (emphasis added). 
126. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 427–28. 
127.   Id. at 430. 
128.   Id. at 426. 
129. Smith v. City of Jackson, 554 U.S. 228, 235–36 (2005); Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 
839 F.3d 958, 968 (11th Cir. 2016). 
130. Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981). 
131. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2012). 
132. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 109 (1972). In 1972, Congress 
amended numerous provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, including an amendment 
adding applicants to the statute’s protections. Id. This amendment adding applicants for employment to 
the already covered employees in the statute’s purview took place after the Griggs case—involving only 
employees of the defendant-employer—was decided in 1971. See generally Griggs, 401 U.S. 424. 
133. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329–32 (1977). “After her application was rejected, 
[plaintiff] brought this class suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as 
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c et seq. (1970 ed. and Supp. V) ” Id. at 323 (emphasis added). In 
Dothard, Dianne Rawlinson applied to work in an Alabama corrections prison as a “correctional 
counselor.” Id. The position applied for required that each applicant weigh at least 120 pounds and be 
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recognized a non-employee job applicant’s right under Title VII to 
bring a claim for discrimination under a theory of disparate impact 
but grounded the decision in Title VII’s amended language of 
“employees or applicants for employment.”134 This case did not 
overrule Griggs or extend Griggs to include applicants.135 
Even with this case law illustrating that Griggs granted an 
employee disparate impact right under Title VII136 while the same 
Title VII disparate impact right for non-employee applicants did not 
arise until Dothard—a case decided after Title VII’s amendment 
adding a reference to applicants—137 some still argue that the ADEA 
provisions “were derived in haec verba138 from Title VII.”139 Those 
proponents, therefore, argue that the two distinctly different statutes 
should be interpreted equally as it relates to the unique protected 
classes named in the statutes.140 The 2009 five to four Gross v. FBL 
Financial Services decision debunked the myth that Title VII and the 
ADEA must track together for interpretation.141 
In Gross, a fifty-four-year-old, long-tenured employee of FBL 
Financial Services sued his employer under the ADEA for 
reassigning him from his position of claims administration director to 
 
 
five feet two inches tall. Id. at 323–24. Rawlinson did not meet the weight requirement, and her 
application was rejected for that reason. Id. at 324. Rawlinson argued that the minimum weight 
requirement violated federal law on the basis of sex, and after filing an EEOC charge and receiving a 
right-to-sue letter, Rawlinson filed suit “on behalf of herself and other similarly situated women, 
challenging the statutory height and weight minima as violative of Title VII “ Id. at 323–24. 
134. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958, 968 (11th Cir. 2016) (emphasisadded). 
135. Id. at 963; see generally Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971). 
136. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 328; Villarreal, 839 F.3d at 968. “In enacting Title VII, Congress required 
‘the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate 
invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification.’” Dothard, 433 
U.S. at 328 (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431). 
137. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 109 (1972); Dothard, 433 U.S. at 
323. 
138. In Haec Verba, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). The phrase in haec verba is Latin 
for “[i]n these same words; verbatim.” Id. 
139. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 183 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978)). 
140. Id. at 183 (Stevens, J., dissenting). “[W]e have long recognized that our interpretations of Title 
VII’s language apply ‘with equal force in the context of age discrimination, for the substantive 
provisions of the ADEA ’” Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. 
Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985)). 
141. Id. at 174. 
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claims project coordinator.142 Gross argued “that his reassignment 
was based at least in part on his age” even if other reasons for the 
employment action existed.143 The plaintiff here relied on the 
motivating factor framework applicable to Title VII intentional 
discrimination claims; however, the Court ruled that this motivating 
factor framework did not apply to claims under the ADEA.144 
Congress amended Title VII in 1991, adding this motivating factor 
causation framework, but did not amend the ADEA to add this 
provision.145 “When Congress amends one statutory provision but not 
another, it is presumed to have acted intentionally.”146 For an ADEA 
aggrieved plaintiff to prevail, he or she must prove that their age was 
the “but-for” cause of the undesired employment action, not merely 
one of the motivating factors.147 By holding that the mixed-motive 
instruction endorsed under Title VII does not apply under the 
ADEA,148 the Court made it clear that Title VII and the ADEA are 
two distinct statutory animals.149 
It follows that if Congress’s intention was to include applicants in 
the recognized disparate impact provision of the ADEA, it would 
have done so. Neither Title VII nor the ADEA has been free from 
amendment since their respective passages in 1964 and 1967;150 
 
142. Id. at 170. 
143. Id. 
144. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 173 (2009). 
145. Id. at 174. 
146. Id. (citing Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 256 
(1991)). 
147. Id. at 176. 
148. Id. at 170, 173. 
149. Id. at 173. 
When conducting statutory interpretation, we “must be careful not to apply rules 
applicable under one statute to a different statute without careful and critical 
examination.” Unlike Title VII, the ADEA’s text does not provide that a plaintiff may 
establish discrimination by showing that age was simply a motivating factor. 
Moreover, Congress neglected to add such a provision to the ADEA when it amended 
Title VII to add §§ 2000e–2(m) and §§ 2000e–5(g)(2)(B), even though it 
contemporaneously amended the ADEA in several ways . . . . 
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174 (2009) (quoting Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 
U.S. 389, 393 (2008)) (citation omitted). 
150. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 255 (1964), amended by Pub. L. 
No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 109 (1972), amended by Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074–76 (1991); VICTORIA 
A.  LIPNIC,  U.S.  EQUAL  EMP’T  OPPORTUNITY  COMM’N,  THE  STATE  OF  AGE  DISCRIMINATION AND 
OLDER  WORKERS  IN  THE  U.S.  50  YEARS  AFTER  THE  AGE  DISCRIMINATION  IN  EMPLOYMENT ACT 
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however, even with the ADEA’s amendments, the word “applicant” 
or the idea of “hiring activities” have not been added to § 4(a)(2), the 
section giving rise to disparate impact claims.151 “Statutory 
construction must begin with the language employed by Congress 
and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language 
accurately expresses the legislative purpose.”152 If the statute’s 
language or lack thereof is clear, the judicial inquiry is complete.153 
 
III. Proposal 
To settle the debate on whether non-employee job applicants may 
bring disparate impact claims under the ADEA, the Supreme Court 
must grant certiorari in a future case to resolve the varied views and 
interpretations of federal courts on this issue.154 The role for  the 
Court then is quite simple—read and hold to the plain language of 
ADEA § 4(a)(2) that provides no reference to applicants or 
individuals contemplated for hire.155 This proposal runs counter to  
the argument that the ADEA is a broad-brush piece of legislation 
providing protection for all individuals, whether currently working or 
seeking work, age forty and over.156 
If Congress’s current desire is to protect both employees and non- 
employee job applicants, then a simple amendment to § 4(a)(2) 
adding an explicit reference to applicants for employment, like Title 
VII’s 1972 amendment, is all that would be needed.157 However, as 
uncomplicated as this language addition might be, the congressional 
exercise would likely be futile in practice based on the defenses 
available for both disparate treatment and disparate impact claims in 
 
 
(ADEA) 9–10 (2018). 
151. Smith v. City of Jackson, 554 U.S. 228, 232–33 (2005). 
152. Gross, 557 U.S. at 175 (quoting Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 
U.S. 246, 252 (2004)). 
153. Kavanaugh, supra note 76, at 2120. 
154. See Kleber v. CareFusion Corp., 914 F.3d 480, 481 (7th Cir. 2019); Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958, 961 (11th Cir. 2016); Rabin v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 236 F. Supp. 
3d 1126, 1127 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
155. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2012). 
156. See generally 29 C.F.R. § 1625.2 (2007); Glenn & Little, supra note 5. 
157. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 109 (1972). 
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§ 4(f)(1).158 Particularly for disparate impact claims, Smith notes that 
“[u]nlike Title VII . . . § 4(f)(1) of the ADEA . . . contains language 
that significantly narrows its coverage by permitting any ‘otherwise 
prohibited’ action ‘where the differentiation is based on reasonable 
factors other than age’ . . . . ”159 Hence, even if non-employee job 
applicants were added to the ADEA’s disparate impact provision, the 
desired effect, supporting older workers in their quest for gainful 
employment,160 is unlikely because the additional language would 
produce little, if any, real change. 
 
A. The Reasonable Factor Other Than Age Defense 
Although the ADEA prohibits intentional  age-based 
discriminatory practices and facially neutral practices that have a 
disparate impact on older workers, the statute includes affirmative 
defenses for both of these otherwise unlawful practices.161 ADEA 
§ 4(f) reads: 
 
It shall not be unlawful for an employer . . . to take any 
action otherwise prohibited under subsection (a), (b), (c), or 
(e) of [the ADEA] where age is a bona fide occupational 
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation 
of the particular business, or where the differentiation is 
based on reasonable factors other than age 162 
 
The bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) is an affirmative 
defense arising under Title VII and the ADEA for disparate treatment 
cases.163 Applied in Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, an ADEA 
disparate treatment case, an employer claiming a BFOQ defense must 
prove both that the facially discriminatory classification is reasonably 
 
158. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1). 
159. Smith v. City of Jackson, 554 U.S. 228, 233 (2005). 
160. See generally 29 C.F.R. § 1625.2; Glenn & Little, supra note 5. 
161. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)–(2), (f)(1); Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84, 
91 (2008). 
162. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (emphasis added). 
163. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e), (k) 
(2012). 
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necessary to the essence of the employer’s business and that the 
employer must be compelled to rely on the facial classification as a 
proxy for the reason validated in the first part of the test.164 The Court 
in Western Air Lines noted that the BFOQ standard is one of 
“reasonable necessity,” not merely reasonableness.165 However, in 
Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, the Court recognized 
that the ADEA’s BFOQ defense only “establishes an affirmative 
defense against claims of disparate treatment,” whereas the 
appropriate affirmative defense against an ADEA claim of disparate 
impact is reasonable factors other than age (RFOA).166 
In contrast to the BFOQ’s strict application of reasonable 
necessity, the RFOA defense only requires that the facially neutral 
“factor relied upon was a ‘reasonable’ one for the employer to be 
using . . . . [A] reasonable factor may lean more heavily on older 
workers . . . .”167 With this statutorily defined defense squarely 
outlined by Congress in the ADEA, the likelihood of an employer not 
having at least one reasonable business factor for a facially neutral 
employment policy is improbable. Especially as it relates to 
applicants and years-of-experience targets, employers have a myriad 
of reasons—employee retention; the role’s value to the organization 
and in the competitive job market; and the establishment of a culture 
of growth, development, and promotion from within—they might cite 
for the practice.168 An applicant-plaintiff would be hard-pressed to 
argue that those factors do not represent reasonable business factors 
and hence, the non-employee applicant-plaintiff would find his 




164. W. Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 416–17, 419, 422–23 (1985). 
165. Id. at 419. 
166. Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84, 92, 96 (2008). 
167. Id. at 96. 
168. Mike Kappel, How Your Business Benefits when You Hire Millennials, FORBES (Sept. 3, 2016, 
4:13 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikekappel/2016/09/03/how-your-business-benefits-when- 
hiring-millennials/#5d00636127a0 [https://perma.cc/N7TE-RLAC]; Pini Yakuel, Why Promoting from 
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B. EEOC Only Seeking a Legitimate Business Purpose 
For those who argue ADEA § 4(a)(2) disparate impact provision 
applies to non-employee job applicants despite the statute’s plain 
language reference only to employees, their premise is that the 
language in this portion of the ADEA is ambiguous.169 Once a court 
defines language as ambiguous, the court then moves to the next step 
in the statutory interpretation chain—deference to the statute’s 
enforcement agency.170 For the ADEA, the EEOC is that  
enforcement agency.171 Although the EEOC views the ADEA 
disparate impact provision as reaching both employees and non- 
employee job applicants,172 the enforcement agency also recognizes 
the limited applicability of ADEA disparate impact claims resulting 
from the RFOA affirmative defense.173 
Following the rulings in Smith and Meacham and a lengthy EEOC 
notice of rulemaking comment period,174 the EEOC, in March 2012, 
issued its final rule concerning disparate impact and reasonable 
factors other than age.175 Here, the EEOC’s rule clarified that the 
appropriate defense for ADEA disparate impact claims was RFOA 
rather than business necessity and explained the meaning of the 
RFOA defense.176 The EEOC describes an employment practice as 
being “based on an RFOA when it was reasonably designed and 
 
169. See Kleber v. CareFusion Corp., 888 F.3d 868, 877 (7th Cir. 2018), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 914 
F.3d 480 (7th Cir. 2019); Rabin v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 236 F. Supp. 3d 1126, 1128, 1132 
(N.D. Cal. 2017). 
170. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
171. About EEOC, supra note 19. 
172. See generally 29 C.F.R. § 1625.2 (2007); Glenn & Little, supra note 5. 
173. Questions and Answers on EEOC Final Rule on Disparate Impact and “Reasonable Factors 
Other Than Age” Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 at No. 7, U.S. EQUAL EMP. 
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/regulations/adea_rfoa_qa_final_rule.cfm#_ftnref1 [https://perma.cc/48KM- 
7HEA] (last visited Sept. 25, 2019) [hereinafter Questions and Answers]. 
174. Disparate Impact and Reasonable Factors Other Than Age Under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 19080, 19080 (Mar. 30, 2012) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1625). As 
the agency responsible for implementing workplace discrimination laws, like the ADEA, the EEOC 
issues regulations to carry out this responsibility. EEOC Regulations, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY 
COMM., https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/regulations/index.cfm [https://perma.cc/JRE7-DUYX] (last visited 
Sept. 25, 2019). 
175. Disparate Impact and Reasonable Factors Other Than Age Under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, supra note 174, at 19080. 
176. Questions and Answers, supra note 173, at No. 3. 
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administered to achieve a legitimate business purpose in light of the 
circumstances, including its potential harm to older workers.”177 The 
EEOC provides a non-exhaustive list of considerations relevant to 
this reasonableness assessment, including components like the 
employer’s stated business purpose, the employer’s fair and accurate 
application of the defined factor, the degree of harm to individuals 
within the protected age group, and any steps taken to reduce the 
harm.178 Clear in the EEOC guidance, a successful RFOA defense 
does not require an employer to meet all of these considerations; 
moreover, the employer may still assert a successful RFOA defense 
without meeting any of these listed considerations.179 This defense’s 
practical results are that time and again, plaintiffs, after identifying a 
specific employment practice ripe for an ADEA disparate impact 
claim,180 will find themselves on the losing end of such claim with an 
employer citing one of many business reasons for these facially 
neutral practices (e.g., market pay increases,181 targeted years of 
experience,182 focused recruiting on college campuses, or specific 
technology skills) that disparately impact older workers. 
 
C. Provide Employers the Knowledge and Incentive to Thrive 
with Older Workers 
Employers, especially in today’s exceedingly difficult labor 
market, are searching for the holy grail of talent recruiting and 
retention;183 yet, those same employers find themselves frustrated 
 
177. Id. at No. 8 (emphasis added). 
178. Id. 
179. Id. at No. 9. 
180. Id. at No. 6. 
181. Smith v. City of Jackson, 554 U.S. 228, 231 (2005). 
182. Kleber v. CareFusion Corp., 888 F.3d 868, 877 (7th Cir. 2018), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 914 F.3d 
480 (7th Cir. 2019); Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958, 961 (11th Cir. 2016). 
183. Workforce 2020: The Looming Talent Crisis, OXFORD ECON., 
https://www.oxfordeconomics.com/recent-releases/workforce-2020-the-looming-talent-crisis 
[https://perma.cc/VVS3-6VWS] (last visited Sept. 25, 2019). The unemployment rate in September 
2018 settled at 3.7%, a low number, the likes of which the United States has not experienced in almost 
fifty years and a rate that is expected to remain below four percent through the year 2021. Eric Morath 
& Harriet Torry, U.S. Unemployment Rate Falls to Lowest Level Since 1969, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 5, 
2018, 4:44 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-unemployment-rate-falls-to-lowest-level-since-1969- 
1538742766 [https://perma.cc/FCP8-LMN2]; see Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population 
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when navigating a complicated web of often ineffective regulation.184 
Instead of clogging courts with non-fruitful ADEA disparate impact 
arguments by older job applicants where employers can typically 
provide one of many legitimate purposes for facially neutral 
employment practices, the more appropriate response would be using 
the EEOC’s voice and power to influence employers to hire older 
workers by educating and incentivizing employers on the benefits of 
such action. To further positive movement, congressional and EEOC 
action should focus on creating incentives for employers to hire older 
workers, those most susceptible to unconscious biases and 
stereotypes, and developing programs that increase older workers’ 
relevance in the workplace. 
The concept of incentivizing employers to hire difficult to employ 
individuals instead of using a regulatory stick to drive action is not an 
untested idea. For example, the Work Opportunity Tax Credit 
(WOTC) program, created in 1996 and renewed eleven times since 
its inception, provides a federal tax credit to employers for hiring 
individuals in targeted and underserved groups.185 Although WOTC 
program research is limited, a Government Accountability Office 
research study “concluded that ‘the tax subsidy was by far the factor 
motivating employers to hire WOTC eligible workers.’”186 
Additionally, Peter Cappelli, a Wharton School professor, analyzed 
 
Survey, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000 
[https://perma.cc/JL56-2KCA] (last visited Sept. 25, 2019). 
184. See generally Kent Hoover, [Ten] Regulations that Give Small Business Owners the Worst 
Headaches,  THE  BUS.  JOURNALS (Apr. 28,  2016, 1:38  PM), 
https://www.bizjournals.com/bizjournals/washingtonbureau/2016/04/10-regulations-that-give-small- 
business-owners-the.html?s=print [https://perma.cc/3XYU-3BF7]; Ilyse Schuman, Michael J. Lotito & 
Betsy Cammarata, Ready or Not, Here it Comes! 2018 Brings New Labor & Employment Laws, 
Primarily at  the State Level, LITTLER  MENDELSON P.C. (Nov.  13, 2017), 
https://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/ready-or-not-here-it-comes-2018-brings-new- 
labor-employment-laws [https://perma.cc/6PNN-6MWU]. 
185. Work Opportunity Tax Credit, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small- 
businesses-self-employed/work-opportunity-tax-credit [https://perma.cc/9LRZ-GQXJ] (last visited Sept. 
25, 2019). The WOTC program provides tax credits to employers that hire individuals from targeted 
groups like supplemental nutrition assistance program recipients, veterans, and supplemental security 
income recipients. Id. Once an employer acquires certification that an individual hired is a member of a 
targeted group, the employer then takes a tax credit to offset a portion of the business’s income tax 
liability. Id. 
186. Katherine English, Conflicting Approaches to Addressing Ex-Offender Unemployment: The 
Work Opportunity Tax Credit and Ban the Box, 93 IND. L.J. 513, 522 (2018). 
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the WOTC program through limited, program-specific research and a 
comparison to a broad range of other well-researched employment 
subsidy programs and determined the WOTC program was cost- 
effective for society.187 Not only does society benefit from these now- 
employed workers being less dependent on governmental programs, 
like welfare, employers benefit from the coveted tax credit with an 
estimated “three-quarters of employers chang[ing] their employment 
practices in some way to accommodate WOTC recipients[] and half 
chang[ing] training practices.”188 
The EEOC recognizes improvement in blatant or intentional 
discrimination since the ADEA’s 1967 passage; however, the agency 
notes that today’s age discrimination often stems from age-based 
stereotypes and unconscious biases rather than intentional 
discriminatory actions.189 In a survey conducted in 2017, “[six] out of 
[ten] older workers have seen or experienced age discrimination in 
the workplace[,] and [ninety] percent of those say it is common.”190 
These high rates of perceived age discrimination, however, resulted 
in only three percent of these older workers’ discriminatory 
experiences being reported as formal complaints either in the 
workplace or to a regulatory agency like the EEOC.191 The statistics 
clearly demonstrate that regulation alone cannot and has not solved 
this pervasive issue. Instead, employers must be educated and 
incentivized to drive real improvement for older workers, debunking 
myths plaguing the aging workforce.192 
Stereotypes about older workers are that they cost more than 
younger workers for the same job, have an increased absence rate due 
to illness, do not exhibit the same mental agility that younger workers 
 
 
187. Id. at 522, 524; Peter Cappelli, Assessing the Effect of the Work Opportunity Tax Credit, ADP, 
LLC, https://www.adp.com/~/media/Reference%20PDFs/Cappelli_Study_2011.ashx 
[https://perma.cc/4VZD-X74N] (last visited Sept. 25, 2019). 
188. English, supra note 186, at 522. 
189. LIPNIC, supra note 150, at 22–23. 
190. Id. at 4. 
191. Id. at 28. 
192. The Myths of Older Workers Need to be Debunked, RANDSTAD, 
https://www.randstad.com/press/news/randstad-news/the-myths-of-older-workers-need-to-be-debunked/ 
[https://perma.cc/N9GQ-YAZC] (last visited Sept. 25, 2019). 
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might, and are less productive and relevant in the workplace.193 
Alternatively, some cutting-edge employers are refusing to fall prey 
to these stereotypes and are instead leveraging older workers to shore 
up the skills shortages faced in America.194 These employers 
recognize the strengths of experienced workers, citing the older 
workers’ good judgment, unvarnished insight, ability to parse the 
clutter from what truly matters in a particular situation, emotional 
intelligence exhibited through keen listening and a strong sense of 
self, and holistic thinking.195 
As noted by the 1973 Senate Special Committee on Aging, the 
“ADEA was enacted, not only to enforce the law, but to provide the 
facts that would help change attitudes.”196 Those facts, with the  
power to nullify some of the long-term biases against aging workers, 
exist. For example, with a focus on market-based competitive wage 
benchmarking by job,197 older workers do not always cost more than 
younger workers for the same market-priced job. Additionally, the 
return on investment in an older worker may be higher with 
millennials changing jobs about every three years versus older 
workers seeking stability and delivering longer tenures.198 This 
increased retention decreases turnover costs and stems the loss of 
employer-specific knowledge.199 Finally, “[a]ge is positively 
correlated with employee engagement, as workers age [fifty] and 
older have the highest levels of engagement in the 
 
193. Id.; Eric Titner, Workplace Tips: Avoiding Age Discrimination on the Job, USA TODAY (Jan. 
23, 2018, 9:02 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/careers/professional- 
development/2018/01/23/avoiding-age-discrimination-on-the-job/109569042/ [https://perma.cc/9XCF- 
ZFMZ]. 
194. Eben Harrell, The Solution to the Skills Gap Could Already Be Inside Your Company, HARV. 
BUS. REV. (Sept. 27, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/09/the-solution-to-the-skills-gap-could-already-be- 
inside-your-company [https://perma.cc/A8EE-U7M6]; Pavel Krapivin, How Organizations Are 
Harnessing the Wisdom of Baby Boomers to Combat Skills Shortages, FORBES (Sept. 24, 2018, 3:21 
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/pavelkrapivin/2018/09/24/how-airbnb-got-wiser-with-the-help-of-a- 
modern-elder/ [https://perma.cc/5LX2-9B86]. 
195. Krapivin, supra note 194. 
196. LIPNIC, supra note 150, at 3. 
197. Building a Market-Based Pay Structure from Scratch, SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT. (Jan. 12, 
2018), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/tools-and-samples/toolkits/pages/buildingamarket- 
basedpaystructurefromscratch.aspx. 
198. LIPNIC, supra note 150, at 43. 
199. Id. at 44. 
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workplace. . . . [H]igh employee engagement increases employee 
productivity.”200 
For unconscious biases to dissipate, especially in the hiring realm, 
and for employers to reap the rewards of older workers, companies 
must proactively work to change their facially neutral but nonetheless 
age-limiting practices. Small changes in hiring processes could result 
in significant changes for older applicants. For example, employers 
removing years-of-experience maximums from job postings and 
delivering web content and graphics that depict the multi- 
generational workforce they seek201 would open the labor pool to 
individuals often excluded before even entering the interview 
process.202 Additionally, employers’ creation of age-diverse  
interview teams has the potential to reduce or eliminate the tendency 
for interviewers to gravitate toward hiring someone like 
themselves.203 “Age discrimination is legally wrong and has been 
since the ADEA took effect five decades ago[,] [b]ut it remains too 
common and too accepted in today’s workplace.”204 Additional 





Fifty years since its passage, courts are still interpreting the 
ADEA’s language, specifically as it relates to a non-employee job 
applicant’s right to claim disparate impact from an employer’s 
facially neutral employment practice.205 Despite clear statutory 
language,206 opponents who believe the disparate impact theory of 
recovery should be available to job applicants argue ambiguity, and 
 
200. Id. 
201. Id. at 43. 
202. Kleber v. CareFusion Corp., 888 F.3d 868, 877 (7th Cir. 2018), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 914 F.3d 
480 (7th Cir. 2019). 
203. LIPNIC, supra note 150, at 43–44. 
204. Id. at 40. 
205. See Kleber, 914 F.3d at 481; Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958, 961 (11th 
Cir. 2016); Rabin v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 236 F. Supp. 3d 1126, 1127 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
206. See generally Villarreal, 839 F.3d at 963 (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. 
Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)). 
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therefore, deference to the EEOC’s position on the matter.207 The 
EEOC, ignoring the plain language of the statute, recognizes this 
disparate impact right as arising for non-employee job applicants;208 
however, in practice, this right provides little, if any, relief to older 
workers attempting to acquire gainful employment. Instead of 
continuing to waive the ADEA enforcement stick at disparate impact 
claims, a stick that packs little punch due to an employer’s 
recognized RFOA affirmative defense,209 Congress and the EEOC 
must leverage their voices and subsequent action to educate and 
incentivize employers, shucking the negative myths associated with 





























207.   29 C.F.R. § 1625.2 (2007). 
208. Id. 
209. Questions and Answers, supra note 173, at No. 8. 
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